

In November, 2003, Avila, Robert Rubin, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights convinced the San Francisco law firm of Farella Braun + Martel to fund a report about racial polarization in elections in the Hanford Joint Unified High School District in Kings County. The financial backing of an established law firm and a well-known civil rights organization apparently helped convince the Hanford school district to settle without going to court, because the findings in my report on racial polarization in this case were no stronger than those in Chino. Shortly after the case was filed, the district elected its first Latino board member, and negotiations between the parties lasted at least sixteen months, but in March, 2005, the Hanford JUHSD became the first jurisdiction to change its mode of election because of a lawsuit or threat of a lawsuit under the CVRA. District Superintendent Marie Banuelos declared that the district was settling for \$110,000 in fees and expenses to the plaintiffs' lawyers because "we believe that our taxpayers' money would be better spent on classrooms, not on legal fees."¹

I. The Golden State of Voting Rights, 2008-18

The Court of Appeal decision was handed down on Dec. 6, 2006. The California Supreme Court denied review on March 21, 2007, and the U.S. Supreme Court followed by denying *cert.* on Oct. 15, 2007. Two months later, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the "Great Recession" began.² In February, 2008, citizens of Modesto voted to replace the city's at-large system with one that elected the City Council by districts, and in June, 2008, the city settled the lawsuit by agreeing to pay the lawyers for the plaintiffs, Joaquin Avila, Robert Rubin, and the large Bay Area law firm that had initially funded their effort, Heller Ehrman, \$3 million. This settlement, said Rubin, "certainly sends a message to other cities and school boards that the at-large election system is susceptible to challenge, and that it will be very costly to defend these illegal systems."³ The arrival of that message just as property, sales, and income tax revenues began to plummet, greatly amplified the effect of the *Sanchez* decision. It frightened many school boards, community college boards, and cities into switching to districts even before anyone filed suit, and to seek quick and inexpensive settlements if they did.

Figure 1 charts the chronological course of the CVRA and from 2004, when the Hanford case settled, through the Spring of 2018. It compares the number of changes in

¹ Eii Yamashita, "Victory claimed in HJUHSd lawsuit," *Hanford Sentinel*, March 22, 2005, <http://www.hanfordsentinel.com/front/victory-claimed-in-hjuhsd-lawsuit/article_c96bd803-697b-5b89-b810-9ec17e505abe.html>; Bob Egelko, "Latinos use voting-rights law to force district elections – School board in the Central Valley had no Hispanic trustees," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 24, 2005, <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/03/24/BAGFIBTQC91.DTL>.

² See <http://www.nber.org/cycles.html>.

³ Adam Ashton, "Settlement in Latino voting case will set Modesto back \$3 million," *Modesto Bee*, June 6, 2008, available at <https://www.modbee.com/news/local/article3108787.html>.

local electoral structures in California that can be attributed explicitly to CVRA lawsuits or the threat posed by potential lawsuits with victories for minority plaintiffs in national voting rights lawsuits brought under the VRA, the National Voter Registration Act, or the constitution.⁴ Strikingly, it shows that during this 14-year period, there were 330 CVRA-induced changes compared to only 272 winning VRA, NVRA, or constitutionally-based lawsuits or Section 5 objections in the other 49 states.⁵ Particularly after the Supreme Court's abrogation of Section 5 in the 2013 *Shelby County* case and the ascension of the hostile Trump Administration in 2017, the number of minority victories in federal voting rights cases nosedived.

The chronological path of CVRA-induced changes is interesting and instructive. There were no CVRA events between Hanford and the decision in *Sanchez*. By 2009, there were a dozen, either lawsuits by the Lawyers' Committee or Avila or Central Valley school boards hastening to stave off the bankruptcy that a lawsuit might precipitate, and in 2011, 21. The number jumped to 56 in 2012 and continued to outpace the number of successful events in the other states thereafter. Particularly important in Southern California were the series of decisions in the first case to go to a full trial under the CVRA, in the northern Los Angeles County city of Palmdale, initially decided by the Superior Court in July, 2013, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in May, 2014, and settled, with a \$3.5 million payment to the plaintiff's lawyers, in June of 2014.⁶ What the cost of the Modesto case taught local governments in the Central Valley, that of the Palmdale did for Southern California. By 2015-16, one of the attorneys who had brought the Palmdale case, Kevin Shenkman, had partnered with Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP) to bring suits or issue "demand letters" against at least 19 local jurisdictions, and the number of settlements leaped. An article in the *Orange County Register* in 2016 listed 37 Southern California cities that had recently either moved from at-large to district elections were deciding whether to do so, or had been sued.⁷


⁴ I counted a change as CVRA-induced if I could find a newspaper article on a change in election structure that explicitly noted that fact or, in the case of school boards or community college boards, a request to the State Board of Education or the Community Colleges Board for a waiver to change the district structure. Sometimes, a local jurisdiction explained its reason for switching on its website. This is probably an underestimate of the CVRA-induced changes, because special-purpose districts, such as hospital or water districts, are less visible and less likely to generate news stories about their actions.

⁵ The data on voting rights "events" is from a database that I have been collecting from extremely diverse sources since 2009. For a description of some of the most important sources, see Kousser, "Do The Facts of Voting Rights Support Chief Justice Roberts's Opinion in *Shelby County*?" *Transatlantica*, 1 (2015), Appendix A.

⁶ Perry Smith, "Judge Orders Palmdale To Pay \$3.5M For Voting Rights Act Violation," *Santa Clarita News*, June 6, 2014, available at <http://hometownstation.com/santa-clarita-news/crime/court/judge-orders-palmdale-pay-35m-voting-rights-act-violation-42207>. The case was *Jauregui v. Smith* (BC 48039, Superior Court, Los Angeles, Central District, 2013).

⁷ Chris Haire, "Local voting in historic upheaval as cities change how officials are elected," *Orange County Register*, Oct. 22, 2016, available at <http://www.ocregister.com/articles/district-733050-elections-city.html>.

Figure 1: Minority Victories Under Federal Law and the CVRA, 2004-2018



As Figure 2 shows, the vast majority of the CVRA-induced changes were not the product of lawsuits (39 were) or of demand letters – a letter from an attorney threatening to sue if the jurisdiction does not initiate the process of changing (83 were). Instead, 211 jurisdictions, principally school boards, either settled without a specific legal threat or did so on rumor, without even receiving a demand letter. That the CVRA was the cause of the shift was made quite explicit. Here, for example, is the explanation for the change to “trustee areas” from the website of the Carlsbad Unified School District in 2017: “The Carlsbad Unified School District Board of Trustees has voted to voluntarily move to trustee area elections, taking advantage of a legal protection that enables school districts to have a say in trustee area boundaries and avoid costly litigation.”⁸

⁸ < <http://www.carlsbadusd.k12.ca.us/elections>>.

Figure 2: Precipitating Event for Switch





Figure 3 demonstrates that the jurisdictions affected by the CVRA closely mapped the State's demography, with nearly a third in the more heavily Latino counties of the Central Valley, and another third in Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego Counties. Figure 4 reveals that two thirds of the changes took place in school boards or community college districts, with less than a third in cities. Most of the State's larger cities elected members of their city councils by districts before the passage of the CVRA, leaving only a few stragglers such as Anaheim, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, and Santa Monica to be challenged by Avila's law.

Figure 3: CVRA Events By Region



Central Valley = Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Tulare, Yolo, Yuba

Inland Empire = Riverside, San Bernardino


Central Coast = Monterey, San Benito, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura

Bay Area = Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, Sonoma

L.A. = Los Angeles

Orange, SD = Orange, San Diego

Other = All other counties



II. Has the CVRA Actually Resulted in the Election of More Latinos?

Some critics of the CVRA charge that it has resulted in little change in the number of Latinos, the state's largest "minority" group, elected to local office, while it has proven expensive for local jurisdictions in legal fees and demographic consulting in drawing new districts. The shifts, an article in the *Los Angeles Times* in 2017 declared,

have so far failed to deliver a surge of Latino political representation inside California's city halls. Of the 22 cities that have made the move to district elections since June, only seven saw an overall gain in Latino council members

A number of factors likely contributed to the low numbers, including historically low turnout by Latino voters and a lack of candidates with the means to run, experts said. Also, even in cities with large Latino populations, some residents can't vote because they are too young, are here illegally or are not citizens.

The threat of legal action has forced cities to switch to council districts, but in some cases the move hasn't resulted in more minority representation because the city already is well-integrated and drawing districts where minorities predominate is difficult. . . .

Douglas Johnson of National Demographics Corp., which has advised dozens of cities in voting rights cases, argues Latinos have made the most gains in cities where the switch to district elections was driven more by grassroots efforts than the threat of lawsuits.⁹

Do the numbers bear out this inverse version of V.O. Key's "*fait accompli* thesis?" In his classic *Southern Politics*, Key pronounced that the disfranchisement of African-Americans in the South in the late 19th and early 20 centuries was not the product of such laws as poll taxes and literacy tests, but was "brought about, or destined to be brought about, by more fundamental political processes."¹⁰ Similarly, these critics downplay the role of the pressure of the CVRA in bringing about the integration of Latinos into local power structures in California. The rise in the Latino proportion of the population would have made that inevitable, they imply. Election structures are, as Karl Marx might have termed them, mere superstructure.

Three preliminary points are worth making. First, it has long been noted that when rumors of a voting rights lawsuit begin to circulate, leading local white politicians may assist a minority candidate to gain election in order to buttress a legal case that the at-large structure is not discriminatory.¹¹ Second, it may be some time after a shift to district elections is initiated before an actual election is conducted in a district in which a Latino candidate has a real opportunity to be elected. Some jurisdictions have scheduled the first election in a minority opportunity district for as long as three or four years after the switch.¹² Third, city council contests often cost much more and require much better known candidates than those for school board posts. Furthermore, Latino children often constitute higher proportions in local areas than Latino adult citizens do, both because more Latino children than adults have been born in the U.S. and because Latino children constitute a larger share of the overall Latino population than Anglo or African-American children do. Where Latino children constitute, say, 40% or more of the children in a

9 Phil Wilson, "A voting law meant to increase minority representation has generated many more lawsuits than seats for people of color," *Los Angeles Times*, April 9, 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-voting-rights-minorities-california-20170409-story.html>.

10 V.O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 533. For a sustained evaluation of Key's thesis, see my *Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1974).

11 In the central voting rights case of *Thornburg v. Gingles*, Justice Brennan's controlling opinion noted that the District Court decision properly noticed "the fact that black electoral success increased markedly in the 1982 election – an election that occurred after the instance lawsuit had been filed – and could properly consider to what extent 'the pendency of this very litigation [might have] worked a one-time advantage for black candidates in the form of unusual organized political support by white leaders concerned to forestall single-member districting.'" 478 U.S. 30, at 76 (1986). In the scheduled at-large election immediately after the Superior Court decision in the Palmdale case, while that decision was under appeal, three of the four city council candidates who ran were either African-American or Latino, a much higher proportion than in any previous election. Best Best & Krieger LLP, "Real-Life Political Drama Provides More Questions Than Answers," Oct. 17, 2013, <https://www.bbknowledge.com/publicpolicy-ethics/real-life-political-drama-provides-more-questions-than-answers/>.

12 See, e.g., Claudia Steinmetz, "Steinmetz: Westminster School District Needs Fair Representation for All Parents," *Voice of OC*, Jan. 16, 2018, <https://voiceofoc.org/2018/01/steinmetz-westminster-school-district-needs-fair-representation-for-all-parents/>; Thy Vo, "Luck of the Draw Gives Moreno Short Term on Anaheim Council," *Voice of OC*, Dec. 14, 2016, <https://voiceofoc.org/2016/12/luck-of-the-draw-gives-moreno-short-term-on-anaheim-council/>.

school district, non-Latinos may well feel that it is only fair for Latinos to have representation on the school board.

A. School Boards

Table 1 gives an overview of changes in Latino membership on school boards in California from the final settlement of *Sanchez* until the most recent data available.¹³ It shows that the number of Latinos elected to school boards that retained an at-large structure increased from 2008 to 2017 by 15%, from 361 to 415, but that even in 2017, they only constituted 12% of the members in those districts. In districts that had always been elected by districts, the number of Latino school board members actually declined from 2008 to 2017, but they constituted 19% of the members by 2017. These two types of districts may be considered to set a baseline for “natural” demographic progression in Latino representation over the period. By contrast, the number of Latino members in jurisdictions that had switched to districts before Jan. 2017 grew by 64%, and they constituted 17% of the members in those jurisdictions by 2017. The simple fact is that the percentage increase in Latino membership from the year in which the CVRA really became effective through the 2016 elections was four times as high in school districts that switched from at-large to district elections as in jurisdictions that did not switch.

Table 1: Latino Membership in School Boards That Switched to Districts Increased Proportionately More Than in Jurisdictions That Remained At-Large or That Had Always Elected by Districts

Election Structure	Always At-Large	Always Districts	Switched to Districts
# Districts with that structure	700	67	178
Total # School Board Members	3513	391	941
Total Latino Members, Jan. 2008	361	76	96

¹³ The list of California school districts and population totals by ethnic group come from the National Center for Education Statistics. Information on the total number of board members derive from the websites of each school district. Statistics on the number of Latino School Board members in each district and year are derived from lists compiled by the National Association of Latino Elected Officials. District structures and changes in district structures were found in a large variety of sources, most notably, requests for waivers to change to by-district elections made to the State Board of Education.

Total Latino Members, Jan. 2017	415	74	157
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But each group of districts did not have the same Latino proportion. It could be that the jurisdictions that remained at-large had such small proportions of Latinos that it would be unlikely for the number of Latinos to increase unless voting and running for office were completely uncorrelated with ethnicity. Table 2, which represents one way to control for the Latino proportions in each jurisdiction, shows that there is some truth in that observation, but that significant contrasts between jurisdictions that switched and those that stuck with the status quo remain.

It is true that at-large districts that retained that structure usually have a smaller proportion of Latinos than other jurisdictions. The estimated Latino proportion of citizens was less than 20% in 444 of 700 districts that remained at-large (63%), while only 34 of 178 (19%) of jurisdictions that switched had such a small proportion of potential Latino voters. That is, of course, exactly how the law was supposed to work. It focuses on areas with enough minority population that discrimination would possibly affect a large number of people.

It is also noteworthy that the proportion Latino of total members in 2008 for the jurisdictions that switched was less than or equal in each decile of Latino percentages to the Latino proportion of total members in the always-at-large jurisdictions. (Compare the column giving the percentage Latino of total members for the same deciles in the always-at-large part of the table with that for the jurisdictions that switched to districts.) Latinos were more underrepresented in the at-large jurisdictions that switched to districts than in those that did not. If the comparative underrepresentation is considered an indication of “need” or “demand,” then the CVRA ought to be counted a success in satisfying that need or demand. In other words, it hit the target of most discrimination.

It is also worthwhile noting that Latino representation in the jurisdictions that elected school board members by districts before 2008 was closer to proportionality in jurisdictions in which Latino adult citizens were not a majority than in either category of jurisdictions that were elected at-large in 2008. (Compare the relevant cells in the percent column.) This merely confirms the widely understood, commonsensical finding that districts provide more nearly proportional representation to minority groups than at-large elections do, where voting is racially polarized.¹⁴

14 This has long been understood by political scientists. See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom and Michael D. McDonald, “The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship,” *American Political Science Review*, 75 (1981), 344-54; Chandler Davidson and George Korbel, “At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Re-examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence,” *Journal of Politics* (43 (1981), 982-1005.

Table 2: Changes in Latino School Board Membership in Jurisdictions with Different Election Structures and Different Percentages of Potential Latino Voters, 2008-17

Estimated Latino CVAP	Total # Districts	Total # Members	Total Latino Members in 2008	% Latino of Total Members in 2008	Net Increase in Latino Members
	Always At-Large				
0-9.9	270	1339	13	1%	2
10-19.9	178	922	26	3%	-1
20-29.9	87	439	27	6%	4
30-39.9	38	184	27	15%	-5
40-49.9	52	258	69	27%	23
50-59.9	46	230	98	43%	11
60+	29	141	101	72%	20
	Districts Before 2008				
0-9.9	15	80	0	0%	0
10-19.9	19	111	10	9%	-2
20-29.9	13	80	13	16%	-1
30-39.9	4	24	8	33%	0
40-49.9	11	67	28	42%	-2
50-59.9	2	10	4	40%	0
60+	3	19	13	68%	3

	Switched to District				
0-9.9	12	60	0	0%	1
10-19.9	22	118	3	3%	-2
20-29.9	51	278	13	5%	13
30-39.9	46	238	24	10%	18
40-49.9	30	158	34	22%	12
50-59.9	16	84	22	26%	15
60+	1	5	0	0%	4

But it is in those areas with the potential to elect a Latino if districts were drawn that we should expect to see an effect of switching, and that is precisely where we see such an effect. There was no net change in Latino membership in the always-at-large jurisdictions in which the Latino proportion of the CVAP was less than 40%, and in jurisdictions that switched, there was an actual decrease in Latino membership in districts below 20% Latino CVAP.

But note the Latino increase of 84% (31 Latino member increase/37 Latino members in 2008) in Latino membership in jurisdictions that were between 20% and 40% Latino CVAP and that switched to district elections. This contrasts with a decrease of 2% (1 Latino member decrease/54 Latino members in 2008) in jurisdictions where the Latino CVAP was between 20% and 40%, but which remained at-large. It is in jurisdictions that are between 20% and 40% Latino CVAP where one would expect to be able to draw a Latino-majority or near-majority district for a school board with a typical membership of five members.

In jurisdictions between 40% and 60% Latino CVAP, where one might expect to be able to draw two Latino CVAP-majority districts, or where a relatively small non-Latino crossover vote might elect a Latino candidate even in an at-large election, the contrast between at-large school boards that switched and ones that did not is somewhat less dramatic, but still quite striking. There was a 48% increase (27 Latino member increase/56 Latino members in 2008) in Latino membership in switching jurisdictions and just a 20% increase (33 more Latino members/167 in 2008) in always-at-large jurisdictions.

It is in jurisdictions over 60% Latino CVAP in which the increase in Latino membership in at-large districts is most concentrated. About 37% of the total increase (20 Latino member increase/61 total increase) in Latino membership on school boards from 2008 to 2017 in always-at-large districts came in jurisdictions where Latinos constituted overwhelming majorities of potential voters. By contrast, only 7% of the total increase (4 Latino member increase/61 total increase) in Latino membership on school boards in switched jurisdictions came in districts that were so heavily Latino. In 60%+ Latino CVAP districts, the Latino “minority” is in fact, a majority, and it can often elect a Latino candidate just as well in an at-large as in a districted system.

The conclusion from this simple analysis of school board membership is that **the CVRA has worked exactly as designed**: In areas with a very small or an overwhelming percentage of Latinos, there was little pressure to change, no necessity to switch in order to increase Latino representation, and little legal action under the CVRA or anticipatory change to preclude legal action. In areas where it might be possible to draw one or two majority or near-majority Latino districts, there were a great many shifts to districts, and Latino representation grew markedly on school boards that changed election rules. Latinos in jurisdictions that shifted had been less proportionately represented than in comparable jurisdictions that remained at-large or that had adopted district systems before the *Sanchez* decision became effective in 2008. Evidently, the CVRA attacked the problem of racially polarized voting in a discriminatory election structure with considerable precision.

B. Cities

The picture is less clear in the state’s 482 cities. As Table 3 shows, there was an increase of 31 Latino members from 2008 to Jan. 1, 2017 in cities that remained at-large, a 12% increase over the status quo, or from 14% of the total city council membership in those cities to 16% of the membership. In at-large cities that switched to districts, Latino membership increased by 7, which amounted to a 15% increase, from 10% of the total membership to 11%. There was actually a larger proportional increase in cities that had always elected its councils by district – 24 or 51%, from 20% to 30% of total council members. So the shift to districts seems to have had some overall effect on Latino representation on city councils, but not nearly so much as on school boards.

Table 3: Latino Membership in City Councils That Switched to Districts Increased Only Somewhat More Than in Jurisdictions That Remained At-Large and Less Than That Had Always Elected by Districts

Election Structure	Always At-Large	Districts Before 2008	Switched to Districts
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# Districts with that structure	354	34	94
Total # City Council Members	1816	239	493
Total Latino Members, Jan. 2008	253	47	48
Total Latino Members, Jan. 2017	284	71	55

Table 4 breaks down the overall city council figures by the estimated Latino CVAP proportions for the cities. As with school boards, there was almost no increase in Latino membership in always-at-large cities that were below 40% in Latino CVAP (an increase of 2 members, or from 4.7% to 4.8% of the 1455 members in those cities). In cities that switched to districts, there was actually a net decrease of one Latino city council member, from 29 to 28 out of a total of 406 members, in cities that were between 20% and 40% Latino CVAP. In cities where Latinos comprised between 20% and 40% of the CVAP, and where councils had been elected by districts before 2008, Latino membership on councils nearly doubled, from 17 to 32.

In always-at-large cities that were between 40% and 60% Latino CVAP, Latino representation increased from 76 to 98, a 29% increase. The increase in 40-60% Latino CVAP cities that switched to districts was comparable, from 19 to 25, a 32% increase. In comparable cities that had elected councils by districts before 2008, the increase in Latino representation was from 20 to 28, a 40% increase.

Table 4: Changes in Latino City Council Membership in Jurisdictions with Different Election Structures and Different Percentages of Potential Latino Voters, 2008-17

Estimated Latino CVAP	Total # Districts	Total # Members	Total Latino Members in 2008	% Latino of Total Members in 2008	Net Increase in Latino Members
	Always At-Large				
0-9.9	106	542	5	1%	2

10-19.9	95	497	24	5%	-7
20-29.9	54	276	23	8%	6
30-39.9	28	140	16	11%	1
40-49.9	17	89	24	27%	19
50-59.9	26	132	52	39%	3
60+	28	140	109	78%	7
	Districts Before 2008				
0-9.9	5	35	3	9%	-2
10-19.9	6	45	0	0%	3
20-29.9	6	46	7	15%	10
30-39.9	8	60	10	17%	5
40-49.9	1	5	2	40%	0
50-59.9	6	38	18	47%	8
60+	2	10	7	70%	0
	Switched to District				
0-9.9	4	21	0	0%	1
10-19.9	16	84	2	2%	-1
20-29.9	36	192	11	6%	2
30-39.9	21	109	16	15%	-3
40-49.9	13	65	12	18%	2

50-59.9	3	17	7	41%	4
60+	1	5	0	0%	2

So overall, the contrast between cities that switched to districts and cities that retained at-large elections was in the expected direction, but was much less marked than that for school boards. Table 5 shows that there is a simple, obvious reason why that might be so: Nearly three-quarters of the school boards initiated their changes to at-large elections before 2016, but only a fifth of the cities did. Since the Latino membership data only carries us through the 2016 elections, there would not have been more than a single election cycle in which to elect a new Latino member or members in the vast majority of cities that are counted as switching to districts in my dataset, and there might well not have been any election at all in a new Latino opportunity district. Heavily-minority districts might have been placed later in a staggered-term election cycle, in 2018 or 2020 or even 2022. Furthermore, city councils are generally considered more powerful and more prestigious offices than school boards are, and they require more campaign funds and do not come with built-in pre-campaign networking organizations, as PTAs are for school board contests. It often takes more lead-time and effort to run for a city council than for a school board post. So it is hardly surprising that increases in Latino representation in cities that shifted from at-large to district elections are less dramatic – **YET** -- than those for school boards. You can't win in a new election system if there hasn't been a chance to run in a new election system. If this analysis is correct, then the pattern in the school board elections is what we should expect to see in the next few years in city council elections. For cities, if the CVRA remains in effect, the 2020s should be the decade in which Latinos are fully integrated into the local power structures in cities that have shifted from at-large to district elections.

Table 5: Dates at Which School Boards and City Councils Initiated the Shift to Districts

Date of Initiation of Switch	# School Boards	# City Councils
<=2008	4	2
2009	11	0

2010	8	2
2011	12	2
2012	44	0
2013	19	2
2014	20	9
2015	11	2
2016	13	29
2017	22	21
2018+	14	25
2004-15	129 (72% of total)	19 (20% of total)
2016+	49	75
Total	178	94